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Introduction
A major theme within the urban economics literature is the residential choice of
households in which they trade off housing and commuting costs.  The classic works of Muth,
1969 Mills, 1972 and Alonso, 1964 follow from this foundation and provide plausible implications
for prices of housing and land, population densities, and household location in urban areas.  A key
assumption in these early models is that employment location is exogeneously fixed in the Central
Business District with individuals free to choose their optimal residential locations anywhere in
the metropolitan area (Mills, 1972).  Empirical applications of the model have tested population
densities, land rent gradients and wage rate gradients in relation to distance from the Central
Business District (McMillien and Singell, 1992).
Employment growth in recent decades exhibits a more dispersed pattern than is assumed
in the monocentric urban model, which has led some researchers to question whether housing and
commuting costs are the appropriate basis on which to build a model of residential choice. For
example, Hamilton (1982) concluded that the tradeoff between commuting and land rent might
not play a significant role in residential decisions.  Efforts to account for decentralization of
employment have adapted the mono-centric model to include suburban nodes of employment that
are also endogenously determined (Yinger, 1992  Wieand, 1987).  Boarnet (1994) contends that
whether employment is concentrated in the Central Business District is not the critical issue in this
model.  The important issue is the role that access to transportation plays in affecting urban2
population through employment and residential choices (Boarnet 1994).  As a result, the basic
residential choice model  can still provide useful insights into housing and commuting cost issues.
Even as these models are extended to evaluate a wider set of issues, the majority of the
monocentric and multi-centric models still rely on an assumption that residential location is
endogenous to employment location, but that employment location is exogeneous to residential
location.  Efforts to deal with the joint determination of employment and residential location
choices have tended to use aggregate data sets in their analysis (Carlino and Mills, 1987; Boarnet,
1994; Henry et al., 1997).  To our knowledge, no studies have estimated the joint residential and
job location decisions at the individual level.
This study uses the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 1990 Census to examine
how wages, housing prices and commuting time affect the joint decisions of where to live and
where to work.  A multinomial logit framework is applied to a sample of 9,438 working-age (ages
22-62) residents of a 31 county region in central Iowa.  Individuals choose whether to reside in a
metropolitan or nonmetropolitan market, and also choose whether to work in the community in
which they live or to commute to another town.  In fact, all four possible residence/job location
pairs occur in the data, although relatively few individuals reside in metropolitan communities and
commute to nonmetropolitan jobs.
The model yields plausible estimates of the roles of economic variables on the joint
residence/job location choices.  In particular, the probability of residing in an area is negatively
influenced by housing price levels, but positively influenced by wage levels.  Incentives to
commute are greater, the higher are wages in the other market.  As a consequence, commuters
have higher wages than do noncommuters, a requirement of the utility maximizing model.  The3
probability of choosing the commuting option is negatively related to the commuting distance,
with probability going to zero when the one-way commute approaches one hour.  Consequently,
the extent of the labor market around a metropolitan area is the distance that can be traveled in
one hour.
Theory
Householders are assumed to jointly select a residential location and a work location so as
to maximize utility.  Indirect utility at residence i with job location j is given by
(1) N   M,   =   j   i,     ,   ) T   , P   , C   , W V(   =   V i i ij j ij
where M designates a metropolitan location and N designates a nonmetropolitan location, and
where Wj is the wage the householder could earn in job location j, Cij is the cost of commuting
from residential location i to job j, Pi is the cost of living in residential location i and Ti is a vector
of observed and unobserved locational preferences.  Indirect utility is assumed to increase with
the wage and decrease with commuting time and living expenses, so that  0,   >   VWj
0.   <   V   and   0   <   V P C i ij
The householder objective is the choose a residence and job so as to max (VMM, VMN,
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Equation (2) implies that commuters will require a wage premium over wages in their
local market.  An individual selecting a commuting job over a local job must have
(3) ) T   , P   , C   , W V(   >=   ) T   , P   , C   , W V( i i ii i i i ij j4
where Cii < Cij.  Because local tastes and prices are the same for the same residential location, Wj
must be greater than Wi for (3) to hold.  Therefore, we would expect average wages for
commuters to exceed average wages for noncommuters, other things equal.
Equation (3) implies that as Cij increases, Wj - Wi must increase to compensate
commuters.  Therefore the gap between wages for commuters and noncommuters will rise as the
distance between the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas increase.  However, there is no
requirement that average wages in the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas differ overall.
Average wages will differ across the two markets if  . P   _   P N M   By definition,
nonmetropolitan areas have lower population density than urban areas.  If higher population per
square mile causes land prices to be bid upward, we would expect housing costs to be greater in
metropolitan than in nonmetropolitan markets.  Because housing costs are a significant share of
consumer budgets, it is reasonable to assume that  P   <   P M N .  If for any householders,
(4) ) T   , P   C,   , W V(   >=   ) T   , P   C,   , W V( N N N M M M ,
then  W   >   W N M   provided that  T   >=   T M N  (average taste for nonmetropolitan residence is no
lower than average taste for metropolitan residence).
1  Metropolitan wages will exceed
nonmetropolitan wages even with TN  < TM if the disamenity of higher urban living costs exceeds
the positive amenities of living in the metropolitan area.
Empirical Specification
The model requires data on home and job location choices, residential prices and wages
for two contiguous locations, one metropolitan and the other nonmetropolitan.  Householders are
allowed four choices,
MM: live and work in the metropolitan area5
MN: live in the metropolitan area and commute to the nonmetropolitan area
NM: live in the nonmetropolitan area and commute to the metropolitan area
NN: live and work in the nonmetropolitan area.
The general form of the indirect utility from each joint choice, Vij, is given by equation (1).
 To operationalize (1), we assume the linear form
(5) N   M,   =   j   i,       ;   e   +   T   +   P      +   C   +   W   =   V ij i i P ij j W ij a a
The taste variables will only affect choices if they differ in impact across the two areas. 
Without loss of generality, we specify taste for nonmetropolitan residence to be TN = ßN.  Relative
taste for metropolitan areas is assumed to be of the form
(6) Y   +   E   + K    + A    +     =   T MY ME MK MA M M b b b b b
where A is respondent age, K is the number of children in the household, E is years of education
of the householder, and Y is nonlabor income.  The coefficients ßMA, ßMK, ßME, and ßMY will be
positive if the variable is associated with stronger preferences for urban residence.  If age, having
children, education or nonlabor income are associated with stronger tastes for nonmetropolitan
living, then their respective coefficients will be negative.
The other specification choice is for the commuting costs, Cij.  These are assumed to
depend on the length of commuting time, tij, but also on age, presence of children and nonlabor
income.  Commuting might be expected to be more difficult with age if younger workers have
more energy.  Children might make commuting more costly, if only because coordinating child
care and job responsibilities is complicated when they are located 30 minutes apart.
Education would proxy for the value of time while commuting, but it should also be
positively related to the ease of obtaining information on job openings across labor markets. 6
Increased nonlabor income may increase leisure demand and/or lower the marginal utility of
income, lowering the incentives to accept higher pay in exchange for a longer commute.  The
assumed functional form is
(7) j    _    i     ;   Y    +    E    + K      + A      +       +      =   C Y E K A ij C ij g g g g t g a t
t g t ii   = j   =   i      ;  
The coefficients ?A, ?K, ?E and ?Y will be negative if the variable is associated with greater
commuting costs across areas.  If commuting time lowers utility, then ?t < 0.  Inserting (6) and (7)
into (5) yields the following system of equations:
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If the error terms are independently drawn from an extreme value distribution, then multinomial
logit estimation is appropriate for equation (8).  The system of equations has 14 coefficients.  This
is a restricted form of the general multinomial logit specification which would have 24
coefficients.
2  The imposed restrictions include that the marginal utility of wage income aW, is
equal across choices, as is the marginal utility of commuting time ?t.  Similarly, living costs have7
the same marginal utility across residential locations.  These assumptions impose six restrictions. 
The remaining four restrictions come from imposing equal marginal effects of A, K, E and Y on
utility of commuting, regardless of whether the commute is from M to N or N to M.
3
Data
The empirical specification is applied to data from the 5 percent Public Use Microdata
Samples (PUMS) of the 1990 United States Census.  We concentrate on individuals aged 22-62
to avoid complications caused by social security and retirement.  Individuals already retired by age
62 were excluded from the sample.
Households in the PUMS sample have completed the detailed Census survey providing
information on individual and household characteristics including housing type, size and cost,
utility costs, individual education, salary, occupation and time spent traveling to work. 
Households are assigned a PUMS region on the basis of location and the size of the region
determined by population density.  Thus the PUMS region in a rural area may include a dozen
counties in order to achieve a sufficient population for the sampling frame, while a central city
may be divided into several PUMS.  Our study includes PUMS regions that form a rural to urban
continuum of 31 counties from southern to north central Iowa.  A total of 9,438 usable household
records were included in the sample.  The metropolitan residents in the sample are in the Des
Moines SMSA, while the nonmetropolitan residents are in the PUMS regions surrounding Des
Moines.  Although the data include whether the place of residence and the place of work are
designated as metropolitan or nonmetropolitan, the actual county of residence or work is not
reported.  This complicates obtaining measures of market prices for housing, wages, and
commuting distance.  Our strategies for developing these measures will be outlined in this section.8
We require cross-sectional variation in wages and commuting times in order for
identification.  However, it would be incorrect to use observed wages or commuting time for
individuals since these are chosen simultaneously with locational choice.  Hourly earnings can be
estimated from reported annual labor earnings, and data on typical hours worked per week and
weeks worked per year.  However, wage levels depend on labor supply choices.  For example,
Blank (1990) found that part-time workers earn less per hour than otherwise identical full-time
workers.  Averett and Hotchkiss (1995) found that benefits were also lower for part-time
workers.  In addition, self-employed individuals have complete control over their hours worked,
making income and hours worked endogenous.  These problems are further complicated by the
need to derive a measure of expected wages in the labor market that was not selected.
Our strategy was to use average wages by education level and job location as the expected
wage level in each market.  To hold constant labor supply, averages were taken over full-time
workers who are not self-employed.  Consequently, averages were computed for each of six
education levels:  < 8 years, 9-11 years, 12 years, 13-15 years, 16 years, and 17+ years.  For each
householder, including those not employed or self-employed, expected wages were assigned using
the average wage for the householder’s education level.  A similar strategy was used to assign
expected commuting time for each of the four options.  Thus, each individual has an expected
wage and commuting time determined by the individual’s education level for each potential
choice.  The wage and commuting values are reported in the Appendix.
Housing prices depend on both the quality of the housing stock and the price of land.  The
latter is the better measure of the relative cost of living, but absent information on location, land
prices are not an option.  The PUMS data offer a partial solution.  While detailed information on9
housing quality is not available, the number of rooms is reported.  Therefore, we report housing
cost as the annual payment for housing divided by the number of rooms.  For homeowners, the
annual payment was assumed to be the per room implied payment on a 30-year loan with a fixed 8
percent interest rate plus the estimated real-estate tax.  For renters, the annual cost of housing
was twelve times the monthly rent, divided by the number of rooms.  For the residential location
not selected, housing costs were assigned based on the average price per room paid by residents
of the same education level.  Implicitly, this procedure assumes that relevant housing
opportunities in the other location are defined by the type of housing consumed by householders
of the same education level.  The assigned housing costs are reported in the Appendix.
The remaining variables are self-explanatory.  Age, education and number of children are
taken directly off the PUMS tapes.  Nonlabor income is the sum of reported savings, dividends,
rent, government transfer payments, and other nonlabor income.
Empirical Results
The sample statistics are reported in Table 1 for samples which include and exclude
household producers and the self-employed.  The model was estimated over the complete sample
including individuals out of the labor force and the self-employed to avoid a potential sample
selection bias.  If labor force participation or occupational choices are made jointly with locational
choices, then exclusion of the self-employed or specialists in home production would amount to
selecting on the dependent variable.  As will be apparent later, the results of the model estimation
are quite robust to inclusion or exclusion of the self-employed and householders who are not
employed.10
Several facts are worth emphasizing.  First, average commuting time for those working
outside their residential location is over two to three times the commuting time for those working
in their residential location.  Metropolitan residents have slightly longer commutes than
nonmetropolitan residents.  Commuters have higher wages than noncommuters, as required by the
theory.  Housing costs are lower in the nonmetropolitan areas.  Wages are higher in metropolitan
areas as required by the lower cost of housing in the nonmetropolitan areas.  Metropolitan
residents were more educated, had higher nonlabor income, and had smaller families than
nonmetropolitan residents.  Commuters were younger, more educated, and had lower nonlabor
income than noncommuters.  While these sample statistics are supportive of the underlying
theoretical model, the stronger test comes from the estimation of the structural model.
The parameters of the multinomial logit model for both samples are reported in Table 2.
In general, the model performed quite well.  Most of the parameters are precisely estimated and
correspond well to the theoretical model.  Wages attract residents and commuters, while higher
housing prices reduce incentives to reside in an area.  As commuting time increases, incentives to
commute decline.  These results imply that longer commutes require higher wages to leave a
worker better off than working in their place of residence.  Areas with higher housing costs
required higher wages to meet a worker’s opportunity utility at other residential locations, or else
wages must exceed those in other labor markets sufficiently to induce nonresidents to commute.
The remaining variables have interesting implications for residential preferences and tastes
for commuting.  The parameters b Mi  will be positive if the variable is associated with an
increased interest in metropolitan residence.  ?i will be positive if variable i increases willingness to
commute.  The results suggest that older householders are less likely to commute and prefer to11
live in nonmetropolitan areas.  Householders with children also prefer to live in nonmetropolitan
areas.  Interestingly, children do not appear to lower the probability of commuting.  More
educated householders are more likely to live in metropolitan areas, and are less likely to
commute, although the effect is not precisely estimated.  Householders with more unearned
income prefer to live in nonmetropolitan areas, and are also less likely to commute.  The latter
effects are the only ones that differ, albeit modestly, when the samples include or exclude the self-
employed and those not employed.  In general, the parameter estimates appear to be robust to
changes in sample definition.
Our primary interest is in the first three parameters.  It is useful to convert these to
elasticities to derive further implications of the empirical estimates.  The comparative static
elasticities are reported in Table 3.  These elasticities measure the impact of a node-specific
variable, X, on node choice under the assumption that X is unchanged at the other nodes.  This is
reasonable for commuting time since an individual could experience a change in job opportunities
that change expected commuting time for a particular job location without altering commuting
time to other job locations.  Conceptually, one could also experience a wage offer at a specific
location that leaves all other wage expectations unchanged.  However, one could not have a
change in housing costs that would not simultaneously alter expected residential prices for both
working in the local market and commuting to other market while working in the local market. 
Therefore we concentrate on the comparative static elasticities for commuting time and wages.
The quantitative results are similar for the two samples, so we confine our discussion to
the results for the sample which excludes the self-employed.  Residential and job location choices
respond inelastically to changes in wages.  A ten percent increase in the expected metropolitan12
wage raises incentives to reside in the metropolitan area by 6 percent, but increases incentives to
commute from a nonmetropolitan area by 7.6 percent.  Increases in the expected nonmetropolitan
wage raises incentives to live in the nonmetropolitan area by 3.7 percent, but raises incentives to
commute from a metropolitan area to nonmetropolitan job by just under ten percent.  It is
reasonable that wages influence commuting decisions more than residential decisions because the
fixed costs of commuting are lower than the fixed costs of changing residence.  In other words, it
will take a larger wage offer to induce an individual to move than that necessary to induce an
individual to commute.
A percentage change in commuting time to a job alters the probability of commuting
across markets more than it alters the probability of commuting within a market.  Because average
commuting time across markets is two to three times greater than average commuting time within
a market, the differences in the elasticities is roughly comparable to the differences in mean
commuting times across markets.  The magnitude of the elasticities imply that incentives to
commute across markets decrease rapidly as the commuting time between the metropolitan and
nonmetropolitan markets increases.  A ten percent increase in commuting time between
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas reduces the proportion of commuters across the markets
by 16 to 17.5 percent, evaluated at sample means.  With mean commuting time of about 36
minutes one way, this implies that the probability of commuting from nonmetropolitan to
metropolitan markets goes to zero at just under a one-hour commuting time.
The comparative static elasticities are appropriate for an individual householder, as it is
possible, say, for a rural individual’s wage opportunities to rise in the metropolitan market
without a coincident increase in average metropolitan wages overall.  However, if wages for all13
commuters to metropolitan markets increase, then wages must be rising for residents of the
metropolitan area as well.  Table 4 reports elasticities which incorporate all possible cross effects
of wages and housing prices.  For example, the impact of metropolitan wages on incentives to live
and work in the metropolitan area must also reflect the fact that incentives to live in the
nonmetropolitan area and commute to the metropolitan area will increase as well.  Therefore, the
elasticity of MM with respect to WM includes the direct effect (.60) plus the feedback effect from
NM (-.11) for a total effect of .49.  Similarly, the effect of WM on incentives to live in the
metropolitan area include the positive effect on MM and the negative effects on MN, weighted by
their respective population shares.  Similar methods are used to establish total elasticities for other
wages and housing prices.
An increase in average metropolitan wages increases metropolitan resident employment by
a greater proportion than it increases commuters into the metro.  While some of the increase in
MM comes from reduced commuting out of the metro, the MN source is numerically very small. 
The more important source is the reduction in NN, with some opting to commute to the metro
and others moving to the metro to work.  A ten percent increase in metropolitan wages will raise
metro residents by 4.8 percent, reduce nonmetro residents by 31 percent and increase total
commuters (increased NM net of decreased NM) by 3.5 percent.
Increases in nometro wages, WN, have a larger proportional effect on commuters from the
metro than on nonmetro resident employment.  Consequently, nometropolitan populations grow
more slowly in response to increases in WN than did metro populations to WM.  Consequently,
equiproportional increases in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan wages raise metropolitan14
populations and lower nonmetropolitan populations.  As one would expect, if WM and WN
increase by the same proportion, commuting across markets is unaffected.
Residential and job location are less affected by housing prices than by wages.  A ten
percent increase in metro housing costs reduces metro residence by .9% and increases nonmetro
residence by .5%.  Nonmetropolitan housing costs raise metro populations and lower nonmetro
populations, but the elasticities are one-third smaller in magnitude.  The effect of equiproportional
increases in housing costs across all markets causes a very small relative shift of population
toward nonmetropolitan areas.  Comparing the third and sixth columns of Table 4, one can
determine that equiproportional shocks to wages and prices (i.e. WM, WN, PM and PN all increase
by the same proportion) will cause a slight shift of the population toward the metropolitan area.
The last exercise conducted in Table 4 was to measure the total effects of increased
commuting time.  The exercise assumes a one percent shock to commuting to and from the
metropolitan market.  When MM and NN increase by the same proportion, commuters decrease
by roughly the same proportion in both markets.  However, commuters are a much more
important fraction of the nonmetropolitan population, so the negative effect on the
nonmetropolitan commuter population is sufficiently large to cause a net reduction of the
nonmetropolitan population.  Over time, improvements in highways have reduced commuting
times from rural to urban markets.  Every ten percent reduction in commuting time raises
nonmetropolitan population by .7% while it reduces the metropolitan population by 2.1 percent. 
The disproportionate share of the increase in the metropolitan population comes from an increase
in commuters to metropolitan jobs.15
The large negative effect of commuting time on probability of commuting implies a
substantial associated disamenity.  Therefore, a wage premium over the local wage is required to
compensate commuters for the disamenity.  A ten percent increase in commuting time lowers
nonmetropolitan population by .7%.
4  The wage increase required in the metropolitan market over
the local market is 5.2 percent if we use the comparative static wage elasticity or 9.6 percent if we
use the total wage elasticity.
5  Therefore, the implied elasticity of WM with respect to commuting
time lies in the range (.5, 1.0).
As distance to the metropolitan area increases, the wage premium commuters will require
increases.  Given an invariant distribution of metropolitan wages, the costs of job search necessary
to capture progressively higher commuting reservation wages are expected to increase, and so
there will be an inverse relationship between number of commuters and distance from the
metropolitan market, even as the wage premium paid to more distant commuters increases.
Conclusions and Extensions
This study shows that an empirical model of individual joint choices of residential and job
locations can yield plausible results.  Nonmetropolitan residents tradeoff lower housing costs for
lower wages in the local labor market.  Those that opt to commute to urban markets trade off
higher wages for the disamenity of commuting time.  All of these results are consistent with the
underlying predictions of the theoretical model.
The results suggest that improvements in transportation that lower commuting time will
increase nonmetropolitan populations and will increase the number of nonmetropolitan commuters
to metropolitan markets.  If instead, policies encouraged economic expansion in both markets
which increased wages equally, population growth would be concentrated in metropolitan areas. 16
Consequently, improvements in transportation to metropolitan markets may be an effective means
of extending economic gains to rural areas.  It appears that non-metropolitan residents are willing
to commute to the metropolitan markets if they live within one hour’s distance or if transportation
improvements bring them within one hour’s distance.
The results herein demonstrate the interdependence of economic growth between urban
and rural markets.  Changes in wages and housing prices in one market affects the number of
commuters and population growth in the other market.  The interdependence between the markets
suggests the economic development plans should be conducted on a regional basis rather than
concentrating only on the metropolitan market or only on the nonmetropolitan market.17
Table 1:  Sample Means by Residential and Job Location
Sample including household producers and the self-employed.









15.297 36.640 35.678 12.292 15.922 15.706
Average housing price
($/room/100)
11.833 10.793 8.650 7.118 11.803 7.342
Average hourly wage ($/hour) 12.481 18.328 12.136 9.531 12.652 9.911
Age 38.9 37.1 38.7 40.7 38.8 40.4
Average no. of children 0.848 1.047 1.050 0.998 0.854 1.006
Average education level (years of
schooling)
11.480 11.872 11.039 10.880 11.491 10.903
Average unearned income
($/1000)
1.317 1.008 0.759 1.258 1.308 1.185
No.  of observations 2851 86 949 5552 2937 6501
Sample excluding the household producers and the self-employed.









17.151 36.479 35.500 15.268 17.743 19.085
Average housing price
($/room/100)
11.568 10.961 8.479 6.624 11.549 6.974
Average hourly wage ($/hour) 13.170 13.544 12.279 11.224 13.181 11.423
Age 38.1 37.1 38.3 39.2 38.1 39.0
Average no. of children 0.831 0.986 1.038 1.039 0.836 1.039
Average education level (years of
schooling)
11.567 11.761 10.994 11.026 11.573 11.020
Average unearned income
($/1000)
0.938 0.765 0.693 0.731 0.933 0.724
No.  of observations 2248 71 798 3432 2319 423018






















































ßN + aC -.057 .804
(.12) (1.59)
N 6549 9438
Log likelihood -6536.9 -8806.1
*significant at the .05 level.
aSample of householders aged 16-61, excluding self-employed and those not employed.
bSample of householders aged 11-61, including self-employed and those not employed.19





Direct Elasticity Effects (Elasticity
Effects on the other 3 Choices)
Direct Elasticity Effects (Elasticity
Effects on the other 3 Choices)
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Table 4:  Total Responses of Residential and Job Location Choices to Wages and Housing Prices
a
Percentage Change in
Node Choice WM WN WM, WN PM PN PM, PN Cij
MM .49 -.42 .07 -.09 .06 -.03 .25
MN -.46 .55 .09 -.09 .06 -.03 -1.52
NM .41 -.42 -.01 .05 -.03 .02 -1.58
NN -.46 .36 -.1 .05 -.03 .02 .25
Metro Residence .48 -.40 .07 -.09 .06 -.03 .21
Nonmetro Residence -.31 .22 -.08 .05 .03 .02 -.07
Commute .35 -.36 .00 .04 -.03 .02 -1.58
aBased on the elasticities reported in Table 3 for the sample excluding the self-employed and those not
employed.21
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MM MN NM NN
< 8 yrs: W
b 8.14 10.14 9.08 8.77
t 16.0 28.2 38.1 16.0
P 920 920 556 556
9-11 years: W 10.45 11.13 10.28 8.66
t 16.9 35.9 35.2 14.8
P 1078 1078 684 684
12 years: W 12.07 10.59 10.45 8.71
t 17.5 31.4 34.8 15.2
P 1158 1158 694 694
13-15 years: W 14.19 14.63 12.88 12.26
t 16.2 35.3 34.7 12.7
P 1324 1324 909 909
16 years: W 23.59 22.60 13.78 14.46
t 14.3 60.0 40.5 11.2
P 1635 1635 998 998
17+ years: W 16.11 16.61 13.26 19.37
t 16.9 23.5 40.3 14.0
P 1463 1463 1290 1290
aAverages based on samples of full-time workers aged 16-65 who are not self-employed.
bW is the hourly wage, t the commuting time (in minutes), and P the annual cost of housing per room.23
ENDNOTES
                                               
1. Note that we fix commuting distance from M to N to be equal the commuting distance from
N to M.
2. These would include a constant term and coefficients on Wi, tij, A, K, Y and Pi in each of the
first three equations.  Coefficients in the NN choice would be normalized to zero to insure
that the probabilities across all 4 choices add up to one.
3. Tests of the restricted model against the unrestricted model will be distributed X
2(10).  The
test statistic has a marginal significance level of around .005.  Nevertheless, it is reasonable to
impose the restrictions because of their consistence with theory.
4. At the sample populations of 8308, the number of commuters falls by 233, but 172 remain in
the nonmetropolitan market in local jobs.
5. With 1473 commuters initially, and with a commuter elasticity with respect to WM of .76, the
implied wage increment to induce 58 more commuters is (58)/(.76)(1473) = .052 or 5.2%.  If
the NM elasticity with respect to WM is .41, the compensating differential is (58)/(.41)(1473)
= .096 or 9.6%.